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The International Strategy of Firms: 
the Role of Endogenous Product Differentiation 
 
Abstract 
We study the impact of trade liberalization on the international strategy of firms (to export 
and/or invest abroad as well as the number of products to be produced and exported) when 
product differentiation is endogenous. By considering product differentiation as a strategic 
variable,  our  analysis  sheds  new  light  on  the  impact  of  trade  barriers  on  the  decision  to 
produce  abroad  and  on  the  choice  of  product  range,  in  accordance  with  recent  empirical 
evidence. Indeed, we show that, even though technology exhibits the same productivity for 
each variety, firms drop some varieties with trade integration. In addition, our results reveal 
that, contrary to the standard theoretical literature, the relationship between the decision to 
export and trade costs is non-linear. When trade costs are relatively high, each firm export and 
is multi-product. Then, when trade costs take intermediate values, firms may invest abroad 
and the choice of producing abroad results from a prisoner's dilemma game. Finally, when 
trade costs are low, firms export but become single-product. 
Keywords:  Foreign  direct  investment,  exports,  multi-product  competition,  endogenous 
differentiation product, trade integration 
JEL Classification: F12, F23, L11, L25 
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Stratégie internationale des firmes : 
le rôle de la différenciation endogène des produits 
 
Résumé 
Nous étudions l’impact de la libéralisation des échanges sur la stratégie internationale des 
firmes lorsque la différenciation des produits est endogène. En considérant la différenciation 
des produits comme une variable stratégique, notre analyse apporte un nouvel éclairage sur 
l’impact des barrières aux échanges sur les décisions d’exporter ou de délocaliser ainsi que 
sur le nombre de variétés à produire et à exporter, en accord avec les observations empiriques 
récentes. Nous montrons qu’avec l’intégration internationale, les firmes cessent de produire 
des variétés même si elles ne sont pas produites avec une productivité moindre. De plus, nos 
résultats  montrent  que,  contrairement  à  la  théorie  standard,  la  relation  entre  la  décision 
d’exporter et les barrières aux échanges n’est pas linéaire. Les firmes préfèrent exporter et être 
multi-produit  lorsque  les  barrières  aux  échanges  sont  élevées.  Des  valeurs  intermédiaires 
incitent en revanche les firmes à produire à l’étranger et ce choix résulte d’une configuration 
du  dilemme  du  prisonnier.  Finalement,  lorsque  les  barrières  aux  échanges  prennent  des 
valeurs relativement faibles, les firmes exportent de nouveau mais deviennent mono-produits. 
Mots-clefs  :  Investissement  direct  à  l’étranger,  exportation,  firmes  multi-produit, 
différentiation endogène des produits, intégration internationale 
Classification JEL : F12, F23, L11, L25 
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The international strategy of ﬁrms:
the role of endogenous product diﬀerentiation
1 Introduction
It is well documented that large and multi-product ﬁrms dominate international trade (Bern-
ard et al., 2009a). For example, in the United States in the year 2000, the top one percent of
trading ﬁrms accounted for over 80% of total trade value while the share of exports due to
ﬁrms exporting a single product was only about 0.4%. Recent empirical studies focused on
the product-range decision at the ﬁrm level in response to trade liberalization. This literature
suggests that trade liberalization has induced ﬁrms located in diﬀerent countries (Canada,
France, Mexico, U.S.A.) to reduce the number of products they produce (see Baldwin and
Gu, 2009; Bernard et al., 2009b; Berthou and Fontagné, 2009; Iacovone and Javorcik, 2008;
Mayer et al. 2009). In other words, trade openness leads to an anti-variety eﬀect or, equival-
ently, a reduction in the range of products at the ﬁrm level. According to this literature, the
main explanation lies in the fact that the liberalization causes a rationalization of production
(due to tougher product competition), ﬁrms dropping their low-productivity products and
concentrating on their most successful varieties. Yet, the existing approaches have failed
to consider two characteristics of ﬁrms dominating international trade when assessing the
impact of falling trade barriers on the product selection of the ﬁrm.
First, the literature on the export strategy does not take into account the fact that the product
diﬀerentiation may be a strategic variable for large ﬁrms. Yet, we know from the industrial
organization literature that the introduction/removal of a new variety and the degree of dif-
ferentiation within the product-range are two strategic decisions that are strongly connected
within ﬁrms (see Manez and Waterson, 1998 for a review). For example, as suggested by
Brander and Eaton (1984), each ﬁrm has an incentive to produce an additional variety in
order to increase its operating proﬁts (revenue eﬀect) but, by introducing a new variety, the
ﬁrm’s proﬁt may decrease because of ﬁercer price competition between the varieties supplied
on the market (cannibalization eﬀect). Clearly, the large ﬁrms are able to manage both eﬀects
by adjusting the degree of product diﬀerentiation between their varieties and the varieties
supplied by their rivals in order to relax price competition.
Second, large ﬁrms can also react to trade liberalization by shifting the production of some
varieties abroad. Indeed, trade liberalization has also been accompanied by an increase in
foreign direct investment (hereafter FDI) ﬂows, especially in major industrialized countries
(UNCTAD, 2006). During the period 2000-2005, average annual FDI outﬂows in developed
countries amounted to 67% of total FDI inﬂows whereas average annual FDI inﬂows in
developed countries reached 74% of FDI outﬂows. It is also well documented that these
inward and outward FDI ﬂows (cross-hauling FDI ﬂows) take place within the same industry
(Rugman, 1987; Greenaway et al., 1998). For example, US car makers such as Ford pro-
duce in Europe and, reciprocally, European car makers such as Volkswagen own subsidiaries
in NAFTA member countries. In this context, multinational ﬁrms (MNFs) can supply a
large product-range abroad in order to prevent their foreign rivals from developing their own
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product range. As underlined by Markusen (1995), multinational corporations are character-
ized by high levels of product diﬀerentiation and advertising. Hence, the choice of degree of
product diﬀerentiation and the geographical location of production are both strategic choices
to handle international competition between rival ﬁrms.
This paper deals with both dimensions. More precisely, our objective is to propose a uniﬁed
framework to study the trade integration eﬀect on the international strategies of multi-
product ﬁrms when they decide strategically the degree of product diﬀerentiation of their
varieties and to produce or not abroad. To achieve this goal, we adopt a game theory
approach and develop a two-country model with endogenous product diﬀerentiation in the
spirit of Hotelling. In our framework, the ability of ﬁrms to adjust the characteristics of their
products impacts the two following (traditional) trade-oﬀs: (i) to serve a foreign country
between producing in the foreign country to save trade costs and exporting to save additional
ﬁxed costs related to the setting up a new aﬃliate; and (ii) the introduction or removal of a
new variety to avoid the revenue eﬀect or to exploit the cannibalization eﬀect. To this end,
we analyze the role of endogenous product diﬀerentiation on the relationship between falling
trade barriers and the international strategies of ﬁrms.
Ouranalysis contributes to two literatures. First, the recent literature on the export strategies
considers that ﬁrms are multi-product and are heterogeneous in productivity (Baldwin and
Gu, 2009; Bernard et al., 2009; Mayer et al. 2009). However, this literature does not
consider endogenous product diﬀerentiation and the cannibalization eﬀect. Feenstra and Ma
(2008) and Eckel and Neary (2009) developed models of multi-product heterogeneous ﬁrms
incorporating the cannibalization eﬀect. Nevertheless, these authors restrict their analysis
to a single globalized world with no trade costs and to exogenous product diﬀerentiation.
Our model captures the relationship between trade barriers, product diﬀerentiation and the
cannibalization eﬀect.
Second, the role of endogenous product diﬀerentiation in the emergence of FDIs has also
received little formal attention. In most theoretical works on MNFs, product diﬀerenti-
ation is exogenous and/or ﬁrms produce a single product (see Markusen, 2002; Navaretti
and Venables, 2004). Lyons (1984) ﬁrst proposed a framework incorporating endogenous
product diﬀerentiation based on Hotelling (1929) but the author considers that ﬁrms pursue
cooperative pricing and diﬀerentiation to prevent the entry of potential competitors.1 The
analyses of Motta (1994), Mathieu (1997) and DeFraja and Norman (2004) are also among
the exceptions. Motta (1994) focuses on the role of vertical diﬀerentiation and trade costs
in international trade and investments. However, the decision of each ﬁrm concerning inter-
nationalization is made by taking its product quality as given. Mathieu (1997) and DeFraja
and Norman (2004) analyze how product diﬀerentiation inﬂuences a ﬁrm’s choice between
exporting and producing abroad when consumers are heterogeneous. However, our analysis
is more general since we consider that ﬁrms may produce more than one variety. Note that
multinationals are multi-product ﬁrms in Baldwin and Ottaviano (2001), but the degree of
product diﬀerentiation is exogenous and the way in which the multinational ﬁrm handles the
1Lyons (1984) determines whether a ﬁrst mover can establish a monopoly outcome in its domestic market
by implementing a strategy of product proliferation under sequential entry. He shows that the production of
varieties by a MNF (or MNFs that cooperate) in diﬀerent countries raises barriers to entry.
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cannibalization eﬀect is only to produce some varieties abroad.
Two main conclusions concerning the eﬀect of trade liberalization on the international strategy
of large ﬁrms can be drawn from our theoretical analysis. The ﬁrst one concerns the decision
to export as an equilibrium outcome. Exports occur even though trade costs are relatively
high and sunk costs related to setting up an aﬃliate abroad are relatively low. This is the
result of the ability of ﬁrms to be multi-product producers. High tariﬀ barriers introduce
an asymmetry in competition in favor of each ﬁrm on its domestic market. High trade costs
relax price competition and favor the revenue eﬀect at the expense of the cannibalization
eﬀect. As a result, each company is multi-product and prefers to export than to be multina-
tional to prevent ﬁercer price competition. This result diﬀers from those in the traditional
literature on FDI in which FDI occurs when trade costs are high enough. In our case, ﬁrms
are not prompted to invest abroad. Indeed, if a ﬁrm becomes multinational in the case of
high trade barriers, price competition is so ﬁerce that the ﬁrm becomes single-product and
operating proﬁts fall. However, when trade costs reach low enough, each ﬁrm exports, but
the two rivals both become single-product and the diﬀerentiation product is maximum due
to a strong cannibalization eﬀect.
Second, the decision to produce abroad is chosen when trade costs are intermediate. However,
two types of outcome are possible depending on the level of sunk costs involved in setting up
a plant abroad. First, when this additional cost is low enough, both ﬁrms are multinational.
Each company has an incentive to set up a second plant abroad rather than to export.
Consequently, price competition becomes ﬁerce enough so that each ﬁrm prefers to eliminate
one of its products and chooses the maximum diﬀerentiation vis-à-vis its rival (in this case,
the cannibalization eﬀect dominates the revenue eﬀect). Note that FDI is cross-hauling
between countries, in accordance with empirical evidence. In addition, this two-way FDI
results from a prisoner’s dilemma game where the conﬁguration in which both ﬁrms export is
a Pareto optimal outcome. Hence, ﬁrms may end up being trapped into a prisoner’s dilemma
when trade costs take intermediate values, provided that the sunk cost in setting up of a
plant abroad is low enough. Second, when the foreign ﬁxed plant-speciﬁc cost is not too low,
one-way FDI and exports are modeled as a chicken game. Hence, there exist two Pareto
optimal Nash equilibria where one ﬁrm becomes a multinational while its rival produces at
home and exports abroad. It is important to stress that such an asymmetric outcome can
occur in a perfectly symmetric environment. In other words, a multinational corporation
and a national ﬁrm may coexist even though the countries and technologies of the ﬁrms are
identical.
These two results allow us to show that trade liberalization (a fall in trade costs in our
approach) leads to a decline in the number of varieties supplied (the available range of product
varieties decreases), in contrast to the well-known Krugman variety eﬀect. More precisely, we
show that, for a given number of ﬁrms, each rival reduces the number of varieties it supplies
when trade costs are low enough. In Bernard et al. (2009), trade liberalization implies a
rationalization of production where ﬁrms drop their low-productivity products. In our case,
ﬁrms rationalize their product range, even if technology exhibits the same productivity for
each variety, by dropping some of varieties with trade integration. This is due to the fact
that FDI can occur in our model and that product diﬀerentiation is endogenous. In addition,
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this allows us to show that the relationship between the decision to produce abroad and trade
costs is non linear, that is consistent with the weak empirical relationship between trade costs
and the probability of producing abroad (see Brainard, 1997 and Ekholm, 1997).2
The paper is organized as follows. The model is described in section 2. In section 3, two
polar cases are analyzed: autarky (prohibitive trade costs) and free trade (zero trade costs).
This gives a ﬁrst explanation of how ﬁrms manage the cannibalization eﬀect. Section 4 is
dedicated to equilibrium prices and the supply of varieties. More speciﬁcally, we analyze
how trade integration can aﬀect prices, product diﬀerentiation and product range when the
location of plants is ﬁxed. In section 5, we determine the conditions under which ﬁrms decide
strategically to become multinational or to serve the foreign market via exports. Finally, in
section 6, we draw some conclusions.
2 A two-country model of multi-product competition
with endogenous product diﬀerentiation
The basic structure. Consider an economy with two countries (r = H, F) and two rival
ﬁrms (f = A, B). We consider one ﬁrm per nation: the headquarter plant of ﬁrm A (resp.
B) is always located in country H (resp. F). Each ﬁrm supplies the same variety in their
home country and in the foreign country.3 Each unit of a variety is carried between the two
countries at a positive speciﬁc cost t. This trade cost is borne by ﬁrms and includes transport,
tariﬀs, customs, bureaucracy, and any other socio-legal constraints associated with selling in a
foreign environment. The ﬁrms practice third degree price discrimination without the threat
of arbitrage by consumers.
Each ﬁrm may be multi-product but, for the sake of convenience, it can supply at most two
products/varieties. Each rival ﬁrm has either one plant located in their home country which
produces at most two varieties or two plants, one located in each country, each producing
one variety. Each variety i can be described by a set of technical characteristics, xi, which
are positioned along a line in the tradition of Hotelling (1929) with xi ∈ [0,1]. Notice that xi
is not speciﬁc to a country. Since at most four varieties can be produced, we have i =1,2,3,4
(at most four varieties are available in the economy). Moreover, we assume, without loss of
generality, that 0 ≤ x1 ≤ x2 ≤ x3 ≤ x4 ≤ 1.
Technology. Firms use the same technology which implies the following cost function:
cqf +Φ where Φ is a sunk ﬁxed cost, qf the total output of each ﬁrm f, c a constant marginal
cost which is normalized at 0 (c = 0), without loss of generality. Note that, in order to focus
on the role of product diﬀerentiation, we assume that there is no additional sunk cost due to
the introduction of a new variety and that the cost of production of any particular variety
is the same for each ﬁrm, regardless of the number of varieties that it may produce. When
a ﬁrm exports from its home country we have Φ = ΦN while Φ = ΦN + Γ when the ﬁrm is
multinational and produces in both countries. In fact, ΦN can be viewed as a ﬁrm-speciﬁc
2These results are obtained by performing a probit analysis since the authors test the investment decision
itself. However, empirical studies on the level of foreign activities show that trade costs have a signifcantly
positive eﬀect on the relative importance of aﬃliate sales (see Navaretti and Venables, 2004 and Neary, 2005).
3See Ojah and Monplaisir (2003) or Iacovone and Javorcik (2008) for empirical evidence.
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cost as in Horstman and Markusen (1992), i.e. a cost resulting from speciﬁc assets developed
by the ﬁrms and, in a wider extent, based on R&D. Furthermore, Γ is a positive plant-speciﬁc
cost borne by the ﬁrms for the creation of a foreign subsidiary. This cost can come from the
transfer of ﬁrm-speciﬁc assets abroad and from the entry into the foreign market.
Demand. Consumers are assumed to have diﬀerent tastes, which can be represented by
a position along the same line as that describing the technology. Thus, in each country
r = H,F, the consumers are located, according to their preferences, on the interval [0,1]
with a uniform density ∆r. We assume that this density is the same for both markets
(∆H = ∆F = 1), which are thus the same size. When consumer j in country r consumes one
unit of variety i, her/his preferences are represented by the following indirect utility function:
Vrj = R − (xi − xj)
2 − pri (1)
where R is the individual income, which is the same for all consumers in the two countries,
xj ∈ [0,1] the technical characteristic of the ideal good of this consumer, xi is the technical
characteristic of variety i, and pri is its selling price in country r. The term (xi−xj)2 measures
the disutility incurred by consumer j when s/he consumes a variety other than her/his ideal
product. Product i is eﬀectively purchased by this consumer as soon as its purchase leads
to a maximum level of indirect utility with respect to other products supplied and as long
as the value of the utility function is positive. We assume that each consumer always buys
one unit of a variety. Notice that xj is not speciﬁc to a country because we assume that the
structure of preferences is identical in both countries. However, because of trade costs, the
price of a variety (pri) varies according to the country in which the consumer lives so that
the indirect utility is speciﬁc to a consumer and to a country.
A consumer chooses good i if her/his utility is higher than the one s/he would get by con-
suming of another product such as i + 1 or i − 1. As a result, all consumers located in the
interval [0,xr12] (resp., [xr12,xr23], [xr23,xr34], and [xr34,1]) will address their demand to the
producer of variety 1 (resp., 2, 3 and 4), where xr,i,i+1 corresponds to the set of technical
characteristic that is most preferred by the consumers who are indiﬀerent between purchasing








for each country. Therefore, the demand for each variety i =1,2,3,4 prevailing in country r
is expressed as follows:


































Type of product competition. Without loss of generality, we assume that ﬁrm A always
produces variety 1. Nevertheless, this ﬁrm can also choose to produce a second variety among
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varieties 2, 3 or 4. Hence, three types of product competition may arise (see Figure 1): (i)
head-to-head competition: ﬁrm A also produces variety 2 so that varieties 3 and 4 belong to
ﬁrm B; (ii) interlaced competition: ﬁrm A produces varieties 1 and 3 whereas varieties 2 and
4 are supplied by ﬁrm B. In this case, the best substitutes are supplied by both rivals; (iii)
surrounded competition: ﬁrm A produces varieties 1 and 4. In this case, the worst substitutes
are produced by ﬁrm A. Ideally, one would determine the choice of varieties produced by each
ﬁrm (or, equivalently, among the three types of competition) by using a game theory approach
(see for example Klemperer, 1992). However, it is straightforward to check that head-to-head
competition is the conﬁguration that dominates the two others.4 Therefore, throughout this
paper we consider that head-to-head competition prevails, regardless of trade costs. It is
worth stressing that under head-to-head competition, the choice of each ﬁrm to produce a
single variety or two varieties is endogenous. More precisely,
Deﬁnition 1. Firms are single-product when x1 = x2 and x3 = x4.
Deﬁnition 2. Firms are multi-product when x1 < x2 and x3 < x4.
 
 x1   x2   x3   x4 
Firm A  Firm B 
head-to-head competition: 








Figure 1. Types of product competition
Types of trade. From the previous assumptions, three types of international relationships
can emerge: (i) NN-conﬁguration: both ﬁrms are N-type, i.e. each ﬁrm exports from its home
4We do not provide details of calculations but this result is very intuitive. Indeed, observe that the
interlaced competition is equivalent to the conﬁguration of four ﬁrms producing a single product while the
surrounded competition is equivalent to a conﬁguration in which two single-product ﬁrms compete with
a multi-product ﬁrm. As a result, the price competition is more aggressive under these two conﬁgurations
(especially under the interlaced competition) than under head-to-head competition. Consequently, the second
type of product competition always provides the highest proﬁts for both rivals.
9Working paper SMART-LERECO N◦10-02
country to serve the foreign market. In this case, the intra-industry trade occurs while no FDI
takes place; (ii) MM-conﬁguration: both ﬁrms are M-type, that is each sets up a second plant
abroad. Hence, cross-hauling FDI in the same industry prevails; (iii) NM-conﬁguration: one
ﬁrm is N-type while its rival is M-type. Under this asymmetric conﬁguration, one country
exports and has inward FDI while the other country imports with outward FDI.
Under the symmetric MM-conﬁguration, international trade is not an outcome when each
multinational becomes single-product. Indeed, the same variety is produced at home and
abroad. In other words, intra-industry trade and cross-hauling FDI are substitutes when
multinationals are single-product. Thus, intra-industry trade and cross-hauling FDI emerge
simultaneously only if multinationals are multi-product.
Sequence of events. Like DeFraja and Norman (2004) and Mathieu (1997), we represent
competition between ﬁrms by a three-stage game: 1) type of internationalization; 2) product
speciﬁcation; and 3) price competition. The decisions are taken simultaneously by the two
ﬁrms in each stage depending on the choices made in the previous stages. The solution
concept is a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. In stage one, each ﬁrm decides either to
produce their varieties at home (N-type) or to be multinational (M-type).5 In the second
stage, each rival chooses the technical characteristic of its varieties. In this way, each ﬁrm
determines the number of varieties to be supplied and their degree of diﬀerentiation. These
two elements characterize the product range of both ﬁrms. In the last stage, the prices of
each variety are set in a Bertrand competition sub-game. The order of the three stages
can be justiﬁed by the fact that prices are more ﬂexible than the product speciﬁcations and
plant location is less ﬂexible than the product speciﬁcation. This sequential game is solved,
as usual, by backward induction. Thus, the perfect Nash equilibrium in pure strategies is
obtained by solving the decision whether or not to produce abroad that maximizes the ﬁrms’
proﬁts, knowing the equilibrium prices and product ranges.
3 Two polar trade regimes: autarky and free trade
To understand how the decision to become multi-product and trade costs interact, we begin
our analysis with two polar cases. We ﬁrst consider the case when countries are in autarky
conﬁguration due to prohibitive trade costs (one ﬁrm per country). We then investigate
the regime of free trade (trade costs are zero). No FDI is observed in either case and inter-
national trade occurs only in the second case. We analyze how the two ﬁrms manage the
cannibalization eﬀect in these two polar cases.
3.1 Autarky equilibrium under contestability
Despite openness to trade, autarky can be an equilibrium in our model. Such a regime can
occur when the equilibrium price of the closest substitute of variety 2 (resp., 3) produced
by the rival, i.e. variety 3 (resp., 2), cannot cover trade costs. In other words, we have
pH3 ≤ t and pF2 ≤ t. Hence, both markets have a monopoly structure. However, neither
5The conﬁguration in which each ﬁrm produces all its own varieties in the foreign country is never an
outcome because of the positive costs of multinationalisation (Γ).
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ﬁrm fully behaves as a monopolist because of the existence of an entry threat from its rival.
Each domestic market is contestable in the way deﬁned by Baumol et al. (1988), even if the
market contestability is not perfect. Trade costs act as a barrier to entry for the foreign ﬁrm.
In this case, the proﬁts of ﬁrm A (located in country H) and ﬁrm B (located in country
F) are given by πA = pH1qH1 + pH2(1 − qH1) − ΦN and πB = pF3qF3 + pF4(1 − qF3) − ΦN,
respectively, where pF2 = t and pH3 = t. Moreover, pH2 and pF3 are determined so that both
markets are cleared or, equivalently, so that we have xH23 = 1 and xF23 = 0. Concerning
variety 1, ﬁrms A sets the price of this variety in order to maximize its proﬁt, knowing the
price of the other variety (2). The same principle is applied to determine the equilibrium
price of the variety 4 by ﬁrm B. These equilibrium prices are given in Appendix A.1. They
are then determined under the assumptions that pF2 = t and pH3 = t and that both markets
are cleared. At these optimal prices, the diﬀerentiation of ﬁrm A’s proﬁt with respect to x1













1 ≤ 0 and d2πA/dx2
2 ≤ 0. For ﬁrm B, ﬁrst order conditions are identical, except
that x4 = 1 − x1 and x3 = 1 − x2. As a result, regardless of the values taken by x1 and x4,
dπA/dx2 > 0 and dπA/dx3 < 0. Since we must have x2 ≤ x3, it appears that the optimal
technical characteristic for varieties 2 and 3 are x∗
2 = x∗
3 = 1/2. In words, the principle of
minimum diﬀerentiation between the closest substitutes produced by the two rivals prevails
when each rival is the only supplier on its contestable domestic market. In addition, it is
proﬁtable for each ﬁrm to supply a second variety because dπA/dx1 = 0 and dπB/dx4 = 0
imply x∗
1 = x∗
2/3 = 1/6 and x∗
4 = 5x∗
3/3 = 5/6.6 Hence, when trade costs are prohibitive, the
revenue eﬀect oﬀsets the cannibalization eﬀect and the intra-ﬁrm product diﬀerentiation is








Proposition 1 Assume two ﬁrms which may be multi-product and produce exclusively in
their own country. Under autarky with contestable domestic markets, each ﬁrm takes the
opportunity to produce a second variety and the product diﬀerentiation between the closest
substitutes produced by the rival is minimum.
3.2 Free trade equilibrium
Now consider the free trade regime (t = 0). The two ﬁrms, which may each produce at
most two varieties, now compete on a market that is twice as large. Since the creation of a
new plant abroad implies a positive ﬁxed cost, no FDI occurs. Therefore, in this two-stage
6Notice that this result does not hold when domestic markets are uncontestable because there is no impact
of foreign competition on the price setting. Without constestability, the monopolist produces a single product
and chooses any variety. There is no incentive to produce a new variety even if the production costs remains
constant.
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sub-game, each ﬁrm chooses the technical characteristic of its varieties in the ﬁrst stage and,
second, the prices of the varieties are set in a Bertrand competition. For notational simplicity,
we drop the subscript r since no ambiguity can arise. The proﬁts are expressed as follows
πA = 2(p1q1 + p2q2) − ΦN and πB = 2(p3q3 + p4q4) − ΦN. By using (2), (3), (4) and (5), the
application of the ﬁrst order conditions on proﬁt functions leads to the Nash equilibrium in
prices, given in Appendix A.2. At optimal prices, the diﬀerentiation of ﬁrm A’s proﬁt with








1 ≤ 0. Hence, the optimal technical characteristics for ﬁrm A are x∗
1 = x2/3
and x∗
2 = 0 because
dπA
dx2













(2 − x3 − x4)(−3x4 + x3 + 2)
8
with d2πB/dx2
4 ≤ 0. The optimal technical characteristic for ﬁrm B are x∗
4 = (2 + x3)/3 and
x∗
3 = 1. Indeed, we have
dπB
dx3









As a consequence, the Nash perfect equilibrium corresponds to x∗
1 = x∗
2 = 0 and x∗
3 = x∗
4 = 1




4 = 1. Hence, the proﬁts are
expressed as follows:
πA = πB = 1 − ΦN (10)
The diﬀerentiation between the two varieties produced by each ﬁrm is minimum so that there
is competition between two single-product exporters. Each ﬁrm is single-product because the
price competition between varieties produced by rival ﬁrms is so aggressive that it dominates
the revenue eﬀect arising from an additional variety. Hence, each ﬁrm prefers to choose the
largest diﬀerentiation with respect to the varieties produced by its rival even if each company
must stop producing its second variety. Our result is close to the conclusion reached by
Martinez-Giralt and Neven (1988). Indeed, in a shopping model where two ﬁrms supplying
a homogenous good competing in price can locate two outlets along a linear city (in the
tradition of Hotelling, 1929), they show that each ﬁrm prefers to eliminate one of its outlets
in order to be maximally diﬀerentiated from its rival. Similar mechanisms are at work in our
model.
To summarize,
Proposition 2 Assume that ﬁrms may be multi-product. Under free trade, each ﬁrms sup-
plies a single variety and the product diﬀerentiation is maximum.
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4 Equilibrium price and product range with interna-
tional trade (stage 2 and 3)
In this section, we analyze the optimal price and product strategies of each ﬁrm, strategies
corresponding to the stages two and three of our game described in section 2. Now, each
ﬁrm can discriminate in price internationally (markets are segmented) and faces positive
trade costs that lead to partial trade integration and reduce international competition. Con-
sequently, the principle of maximum diﬀerentiation between varieties produced by rivals
prevailing under free trade can be challenged. By relaxing price competition, positive trade
costs allow ﬁrms to be multi-product. Optimal prices and product characteristic must be
determined for each of the three following conﬁgurations that may arise in stage one of the
game: (i) both ﬁrms export from their home country (NN-type); (ii) both ﬁrms are mul-
tinational (MM-type), the two symmetric conﬁgurations; (iii) only one ﬁrm is multinational
while the other exports (MN-type), the asymmetric conﬁguration. The equilibrium proﬁts
are also calculated in each case since their comparison allows us to determine the perfect
Nash equilibrium in stage one of the game. In the next section, we will see that each of these
three conﬁgurations can be a perfect Nash equilibrium.
4.1 Firms produce exclusively in their domestic country (NN-
type)
For each ﬁrm, varieties are produced and sold at home and exported abroad. Therefore, in
this conﬁguration, no FDI takes place. However, tariﬀ protection distorts competition and
two opposite mechanisms are at work. First, trade barriers give an advantage to the domestic
ﬁrm on its home market. Second, these barriers reduce the ﬁrm’s access to the foreign market.
The ﬁrst mechanism alters the principle of maximum diﬀerentiation in order to increase the
local market shares. In this way, it may be proﬁtable for each rival to introduce a second
variety (a revenue eﬀect appears in this case). Conversely, the second mechanism favors
maximum diﬀerentiation in order to limit the decline of the market share abroad. In fact,
when the trade barriers are suﬃciently high, the ﬁrst mechanism prevails over the second
and both ﬁrms are multi-product.
The proﬁt functions for ﬁrms A and B are given by, respectively
π
NN
A (t) = pH1qH1 + (pF1 − t)qF1 + pH2qH2 + (pF2 − t)qF2 − ΦN (11)
π
NN
B (t) = pF3qF3 + (pH3 − t)qH3 + pF4qF4 + (pH4 − t)qH4 − ΦN. (12)
The proﬁt maximizing prices for ﬁrms A and B are reported in Appendix A.3. Exports are




2 ≡ (x3 + x2 + 2)(x3 − x2) ∈ [0,3] (13)
t < t
max
3 ≡ (4 − x3 − x2)(x3 − x2) ∈ [0,3]. (14)
Knowing equilibrium prices, ﬁrm A’s proﬁt diﬀerentiation with respect to x1 is given by (7)
(up to a constant) so that x∗
1 = x2/3. Given the last equality, the proﬁt diﬀerentiation with
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respect to x2 is expressed as follows:
dπA
dx2





9(x3 − x2)2 (15)
where
ΛA ≡ (x3 − x2)
2[4 + 8x2 − 4x
2




Similar expressions are obtained for ﬁrm B. Indeed, solving the ﬁrst order conditions for
variety 4 (dπB/dx4 = 0) leads to x∗
4 = (2 + x3)/3 and, then, we have
dπB
dx3





9(x3 − x2)2 (16)
where
ΛB ≡ (x3 − x2)




Two sub-cases must be distinguished according to the level of trade costs, to determine the
optimal technical characteristics of varieties 2 and 3.
a. Like under free trade, low trade costs imply maximum product diﬀerentiation between
varieties produced by the rivals. More precisely, the outcome x∗
1 = x∗
2 = 0 and x∗
3 = x∗
4 = 1
remains an equilibrium if and only if t < t ≡
√
3 where t < tmax
i (with i = 2,3). Indeed, the
expressions of proﬁt diﬀerentiation are given by
dπA
dx2













and is negative (resp. positive) for ﬁrm A (resp. ﬁrm B) when t < t. Consequently, each ﬁrm
becomes single-product when trade costs reach low values. In other words, when trade costs
are low enough, the minimum diﬀerentiation between varieties 1 and 2 holds even though the
variety produced by the foreign rival is imported with positive trade costs. Hence, equilibrium









F2 = 1 + 2t/3 (17)







F2, respectively. As a result, the domestic demand to each ﬁrm is given
by qA
H = qB
F = (1 + t/3)/2 > 1/2 while the foreign demands are qA
F = qB
H = 1 − qA
H < 1/2
when t < t. Trade costs imply that the price at home is lower than the price abroad and
correlatively that domestic sales are higher than foreign sales. Finally, the proﬁts of each
ﬁrm are equal and are given by πNN
A (t < t) = πNN
B (t < t) = ΠNN(t < t) − ΦN with
Π
NN(t < t) ≡ 1 + t
2/9. (18)
When trade costs cross below t, overall proﬁts decline, even if operating proﬁts arising from
exports increase. In fact, the total sales (qr1+qs1) remain constant whereas the average price
decreases because of ﬁercer price competition between the rivals.
b. When trade costs are high enough (t > t) the maximum diﬀerentiation does not hold, like
under autarky with contestability. Each ﬁrm has an incentive to produce a second variety due
14Working paper SMART-LERECO N◦10-02
to the advantage each ﬁrm has in its domestic market. The positive revenue eﬀect dominates
the competition eﬀect when trade integration is weak. From the ﬁrst order conditions for
varieties 1 and 4, we have x∗
1 = x2/3 and x∗
4 = (2 + x3)/3 while the ﬁrst order conditions
for varieties 2 and 3 now imply that x∗
2 > 0 and x∗
3 = 1 − x∗
2 when t > t. However, given
constraints (13) and (14), we must have x∗
2 < 1/2 − t/6 and x∗
3 > 1/2 + t/6 or, equivalently,
t < 3(1 − 2x∗
2). As a result, we have (3 −
√
3)/6 > x∗
2 > 0 and 1 > x∗




i > t > t. It is worth stressing that because (3 −
√
3)/6 ≈ 0.21, intra-ﬁrm product
diﬀerentiation is less than inter-ﬁrm product diﬀerentiation, contrary to the autarky regime
with contestable domestic markets. This reveals that price competition remains strong even
though national economies are weakly integrated.
The equilibrium prices of each variety are now as follows:
p
∗






























The introduction of a new variety by each rival reduces the equilibrium prices of the initial
variety produced by each ﬁrm. The principle of reciprocal dumping is still valid as in Brander
and Krugman (1983) when oligopolistic ﬁrms become multi-product. Each ﬁrm has a smaller
markup for each variety in its export market than at home. However, the diﬀerence between
the f.o.b price for exports and the domestic price for each variety is less than trade costs and
is not aﬀected by the intra-ﬁrm product diﬀerentiation.
In addition, the price wedge between varieties belonging to each ﬁrm depends only on the






r4 = −(1 − x∗
3)2/2. This means that increasing intra-ﬁrm product diﬀerentiation
increases the market share of the ﬁrst variety in the domestic country, regardless of trade
costs (q∗
H1 = x∗
2/3) as well as the domestic market share of the second variety when t > t
(q∗
H2 = 1/2 + t/[6(1 − 2x∗
2)] − x∗
2/3 > (1 + t/3)/2 and q∗
F2 = 1 − q∗
H2). Similar expressions
are valid for ﬁrm B. Consequently, the production of a new variety by a ﬁrm raises the level
of demand in its domestic market and by symmetry reduces its market share in the foreign
country. Thus, the revenue eﬀect due to the introduction of a new variety only works in the
domestic market.
Hence, when tmax
i > t > t, given equilibrium outputs (x∗
1 = x∗
2/3, x∗




2)/3) as well as equilibrium prices, the proﬁt of each ﬁrm is given by ΠNN(t > t)−ΦN
with
Π











where ΠNN(t > t) ∈ (1,1 + t2/9) when tmax
i > t > t.
To summarize,
Proposition 3 Assume that each ﬁrm exports to serve the foreign market. When trade
costs are high enough, each ﬁrm is multi-product. When trade costs are low, both rivals are
single-product.
Hence, when ﬁrms export, high trade costs favor the emergence of multi-product ﬁrms. High
tariﬀ barriers distort competition so that the cannibalization eﬀect is weak. In this context,
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each ﬁrm has an incentive to be multi-product due to the increase in domestic revenues which
are higher than the fall in revenues from foreign sales. However, when trade costs shrink, the
cannibalization eﬀect becomes stronger so that intra-ﬁrm product diﬀerentiation decreases.
When trade costs become low enough, ﬁrms become single-product.
4.2 Firms are multinational (MM-type)
We now consider the case where each ﬁrm is a multinational. A second plant is now located
abroad. At most, four varieties can be produced and traded with a positive trade cost.
Without loss of generality, variety 1 is always produced in the home country of ﬁrm A
whereas variety 2 is produced abroad. For ﬁrm B, two cases can be studied. The ﬁrst case
corresponds to the conﬁguration in which ﬁrm B produces variety 4 in its home country and
variety 3 in the foreign country. This case means that the production of the best substitute
for variety 3 produced by the rival (variety 2) does not occur in the same country. The
other case implies that the production of the best substitute for variety 3 produced by the
rival (variety 2) takes place in the same country. Both cases lead to maximum diﬀerentiation
between varieties produced by rival ﬁrms. Consequently, we present only the ﬁrst case where
price competition is less ﬁerce.
When varieties 1 and 3 are produced in country H whereas varieties 2 and 4 are produced
in country F, the expressions of the proﬁts are:
π
MM
A (t) = pH1qH1 + (pF1 − t)qF1 + (pH2 − t)qH2 + pF2qF2 − ΦM (21)
π
MM
B (t) = pH3qH3 + (pF3 − t)qF3 + (pH4 − t)qH4 + pF4qF4 − ΦM. (22)
At equilibrium prices (given in Appendix A.4), the diﬀerentiation of ﬁrm A’s proﬁt with
respect to x1 is given by (7) (up to a constant) so that x∗
1 = x2/3. Given the last equality,










9(x3 − x2)2 < 0.
The ﬁrst order condition for ﬁrm B (dπB/dx4 = 0) gives x∗
4 = (2 + x3)/4 while the proﬁt










9(x3 − x2)2 > 0 (23)
Hence, dπB/dx3 > 0 and dπA/dx2 < 0, regardless of trade costs. In other words, x2 tends
towards 0 while x3 tends towards 1. However, each ﬁrm becomes single-product before
that cannibalization eﬀect becomes total. Consequently, competition between single-product
ﬁrms occurs so that product diﬀerentiation is maximum. Indeed, we have x∗
1 = x∗
2 = 0 and
x∗
3 = x∗
4 = 1 and equilibrium prices are p∗
ri = 1 with r = H,F and i =1,..,4. In other words,
rival ﬁrms have the same market share in the two countries. Consequently, the equilibrium
proﬁts are expressed as follows:
π
MM
A = 1 − ΦM = π
MM
B . (24)
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Despite the trade barriers, the product diﬀerentiation is maximum among varieties produced
by rival ﬁrms. When ﬁrms produce in both countries, the competition distortion arising from
trade barriers is very weak. Because of direct investments, no domestic market is protected
from international competition. Therefore, whatever the level of trade integration, each
MNF does not take up the opportunity to be multi-product and the principle of maximum
diﬀerentiation among rival varieties holds.
To summarize,
Proposition 4 Assume that both ﬁrms are multinational. Whatever the level of trade costs,
each ﬁrm is single product and the product diﬀerentiation is maximum so that no intra-
industry trade occurs.
Hence, the same product is produced and sold in both markets/countries by each MNF. Thus,
foreign investments and exports are substitutes. More precisely, this implies that when cross
hauling foreign investments takes place, no international intra-industry trade occurs. This
result is discussed below.
Additionally, operating proﬁts in domestic and foreign markets are identical for each ﬁrm.
However, the ﬁxed cost associated with the domestic production is lower than the ﬁxed cost
associated with the foreign production. Hence, each ﬁrm accepts a smaller proﬁt for each
unity of variety produced abroad than for that produced at home. Thus, in the sense of
Baldwin and Ottaviano (2001), the two-way FDI can be viewed as reciprocal FDI dumping.
4.3 Asymmetric conﬁguration (MN-type)
Now we assume that only one ﬁrm must export to serve the foreign country (say ﬁrm A)
while the other ﬁrm (ﬁrm B) is multinational so that varieties 1 and 2 are always produced
in country H. The proﬁt function of ﬁrm A is given by (11). For ﬁrm B, it is straightforward
to demonstrate that the multinational prefers to produce variety 3 in its home country and,
thus, to produce variety 4 in country H.7 By producing variety 3 in country F and not
variety 4, it can enjoy a higher level of market power at home. Trade barriers reduce the




B (t) = pF3qF3 + (pH3 − t)qH3 + (pF4 − t)qF4 + pH4qH4 − ΦM.
As under the conﬁguration in which both ﬁrms export, three subcases must be distinguished
according to the level of trade costs, to determine the optimal technical characteristics of
varieties.





4 = 1 is always an equilibrium. Low trade costs increase price competition so that
ﬁrms become single-product and product diﬀerentiation is maximum even though asymmetry
7Indeed, under the conﬁguration in which ﬁrm B produces variety 3 in country H, its proﬁt function is
given by (22). It appears that dπNM
A /dx2 < 0 and dπNM
B /dx3 > 0 so that the product diﬀerentiation is
maximum between varieties 2 and 3 because the price competition between rivals prevailing in country H is
very aggressive. However, we also have dπNM
B /dx4 < 0 whereas we must have x3 ≤ x4. This means that the
multinational company has an incentive to produce variety 3 in its home country and variety 4 abroad.
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F1 = 1 + 2t/3 and p∗
F4 = 1 + t/3 while expressions of equilibrium output are expressed as
follows: qA
H = qB
H = 1/2, qA
F = (1 − t/3)/2 and qB
F = 1 − qA
F. As a result, equilibrium proﬁts
for ﬁrms A and B are given by
π
NMa
A = [1 + (1 − t/3)
2]/2 − ΦN (25)
π
NMa
B = [1 + (1 + t/3)
2]/2 − ΦM. (26)
The operating proﬁts are higher for the multinational because its domestic market F is
protected by trade costs (ﬁrm A exports) while no ﬁrm has an advantage in country H. As
a result, the multinational has the same market share in country H as its rival ﬁrm while its
market share is higher in its home country.
(b) When trade costs are intermediate (4/3 > t > 1), the market share of variety 3 (resp., 4)
in country H (resp., F) is not positive. The production of one variety by the multinational
in one country prevents imports of its other variety from the other country. For example,
in country H, individuals prefer to consume variety 4 instead of variety 3 because the price
wedge between these varieties is too high when trade costs are high enough. This is a "partial"
cannibalization eﬀect. This cannibalization eﬀect does not lead to the production of a single
variety by the MNF but eliminates the opportunity to sell the same variety in both countries.
Consequently, when 4/3 > t > 1, the nature of competition between the rivals changes.
Indeed, in each market, the closest substitute of the varieties produced by the MNF is now
a variety produced by its rival. Moreover, the cannibalization eﬀect implies that no intra-
ﬁrm trade occurs for the MNF even if this ﬁrm is a multi-product producer. In fact, the




B) the variety produced by ﬁrm B — the multinational — in country H
(resp., country F) to serve exclusively this country. Now, we must have xH
B > x2 > x1 and
xF
B > x2 > x1. It is not surprising to check that dπNMb
B /dxH
B > 0 and dπNMb
A /dx2 < 0,
regardless of trade costs. Then, ﬁrm A becomes single-product (x∗
1 = x∗
2 = 0) and product
diﬀerentiation between rival varieties produced in country H is maximum. Again, since no
imports from country F prevail, the price competition is very ﬁerce in country H.
Concerning the variety produced by the multinational and consumed exclusively in its home
market (country F), its optimal technical characteristic is given by
x
F
B(t) = 2/3 +
√
4 − 3t/3 ∈ [2/3,1]














B − ΦM (28)
8Note that there is no discontinuity when the regime moves from case (a) to case (b). Indeed, when t = 1,
xF
B(t) = 1 and, thus, (27)=(25) as well as (28)=(26).






































Hence, when t varies from 1 to 4/3, x∗
3(t) decreases, meaning that the market share of the
multinational increases in its home country. As previously, increasing trade costs raise its
market power, leading to a fall in the degree of product diﬀerentiation in country F while
the degree of product diﬀerentiation is not aﬀected in country H.
(c) Finally, when trade costs become high enough (t > 4/3), we now have dπMNc
B /dxF
B < 0.
In this case, the multinational (ﬁrm B) has an incentive to reduce diﬀerentiation between
its own varieties (xF
B converge to zero). However, there exists a limit value of xF
B (xF
B) below
which no export of the variety produced by ﬁrm A from country H to country F takes
place. This threshold value is given by xF
B ≡
√
1 + t − 1. Hence, when xF
B reaches xF
B,
the multinational becomes the only supplier in its home market. As in section 2, market
F becomes contestable because of the entry threat from ﬁrm A. Then, the MNF does
not fully behave as a monopolist. The optimal price under this conﬁguration is given by
2xF
B/3+2t/3−2(xF
B)2/3. As a result, the optimal technical characteristic is given by xF
B = 1/2.
It is easy to check that 1/2 < xF
B. This implies that, at equilibrium, ﬁrm A is single-product
and does not export. Thus, equilibrium proﬁts are given by
π
NMc
A = 1/2 − ΦN (31)
π
NMc
B = 1/2 + (1/6 + 2t/3) − ΦM. (32)
To summarize,
Proposition 5 Assume that one ﬁrm must export to serve the foreign country while the other
ﬁrm is multinational. When trade costs are low enough (t < 1), both ﬁrms are single product.
When trade costs become suﬃciently high (t > 1), the multinational becomes multi-product,
while its rival remains single-product. In addition, trade is unilateral when 1 < t < 4/3 and
no trade occurs when t > 4/3.
Two comments are in order. First, when t > 4/3, the proﬁts of the ﬁrm producing in its
home country do not only depend on trade costs because this ﬁrm does not serve the foreign
country. Such a result also occurs when rivals are multinational ﬁrms (see section 4.2).
Hence, contrary to Baldwin and Ottaviano (2001), the existence and the direction of intra-
industry trade is aﬀected by foreign direct investments. Second, the fact that ﬁrm A does
not export, does not depend on the type of product competition (head-to-head competition,
interlaced competition, and surrounded competition). Indeed, when trade costs are high
enough, the choice of xF
B = 1/2 (and the selling price) by the multinational (ﬁrm B) for its
home product implies that its rival will never be able to ﬁnd a technical characteristic that
makes it proﬁtable to export to serve country F.
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5 Exports vs. FDI (stage one)
In this section, we ﬁrst determine the perfect Nash equilibria or equivalently when ﬁrms
decide to become multinational or national. The analysis of the results are reported in the
next subsection.
5.1 Perfect Nash equilibrium
Four stage-one outcomes must be considered: NN outcome, MM outcome and two MN
outcomes. We show below that these four outcomes can be of perfect Nash equilibria. Before
determining the equilibrium outcome, it is worth stressing that proﬁts reach higher values
when both ﬁrms export than when they are multinational. Comparisons between (24) and
(18) or (20) show that operating proﬁts are higher when ﬁrms export whatever trade costs.
Indeed, price competition is lower when rivals produce exclusively in their own country.
Moreover, MNFs incur additional ﬁxed costs (Γ) in setting up a subsidiary abroad.9
To solve the ﬁrst stage of the game, it may be useful to use the following proﬁt bimatrix:
Table 1. Proﬁts of both ﬁrms (πA;πB)10
Firm A \ Firm B N M





B 1−ΦN − Γ; 1−ΦN − Γ
where k = {a,b,c} (see section 4.3).
Three types of perfect Nash equilibria can emerge: (i) both ﬁrms are multinational; (ii)
both ﬁrms export from their home country; (iii) one ﬁrm is multinational while its rival
produces exclusively at home. The type of equilibrium depends on trade costs (t) and the
multinationalization cost (Γ). The conditions under which such equilibria emerge are detailed
below.
(i) both ﬁrms are multinational (or two-way FDI). Given the results obtained in
the previous section, it is useful to distinguish between three subcases, as in section 4.3,
to determine conditions under which each ﬁrm produces in both countries: (a) t ≤ 1, (b)
1 < t < 4/3, (c) 4/3 ≤ t. Hence, the conﬁguration in which both ﬁrms are multinational
(MM-type) is a perfect Nash equilibrium if and only if:
Γ < t/3 − t
2/18 ≡ Γ
M
a when t ≤ 1




b ∈ (0,1/2) when 4/3 > t > 1
Γ < 1/2 ≡ Γ
M
c when t ≥ 4/3
where ΠNMb
A ∈ [1/2,1) is the operating proﬁt when a ﬁrm decides to export while its rival
is a multinational (see (29)). The details of calculation are provided in Appendix B.1. By
9This result diﬀers from that obtained in Baldwin and Ottaviano (2001). The authors show that there
exist some conditions under which proﬁts reach their highest levels when both ﬁrms are multinational. When
product diﬀerentiation is endogenous, proﬁts are always higher when both ﬁrms export.
10N is the strategy consisting in only producing in its home country and M is the strategy consisting in
producing in both countries.
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inspection, ΓM
a (t) and ΓM
b (t) increase with trade costs as long as t < 4/3 (see Figure 2). In
other words, below a limit value of trade costs (t = 4/3), the MM conﬁguration in which each
ﬁrm is a multinational is a perfect Nash equilibrium becomes less and less likely when trade
costs decline. When trade costs are high (t ≥ 4/3), the existence of two-way FDI does not
depend directly on the level of trade costs. Two reasons explain such a result. First, when
both ﬁrms are multinational, neither ﬁrm exports so that equilibrium prices and ouputs are
unaﬀected by trade costs (see section 4.2). Second, when a ﬁrm decides to produce exclusively
in its home country when its rival is a multinational, the former ﬁrm does not export when
t > 4/3 so that its proﬁts do not depend on trade costs (see section 4.3.c). As a consequence,
the limit value below which each ﬁrm remains a multinational when its rival also produces
in both countries is not aﬀected by trade costs as long as t > 4/3. Finally, it should be also
noted that ΓM
b (4/3) = ΓM
c and ΓM
a (1) = ΓM
b (1) because xF
B(t) = 1 (see Figure 2). In other
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Figure 2. FDI vs. Exports
(ii) Both ﬁrms only produce in their home country. Again, the details of the calcu-
lations are provided in Appendix B.2. We have a Nash equilibrium where both ﬁrms export
from their home country if and only if:
Γ > t/3 − t
2/18 ≡ Γ
N










b > 0 when 4/3 > t > 1
Γ > 2/3 + 2t/3 − Π
NN(t) ≡ Γ
N
c > 0 when t ≥ 4/3
where ΠMNb
B corresponds to the operating proﬁts when a ﬁrm becomes multinational while
its rival exports (see (30)). We also have ΠNN(t) = 1+t2/9 when 4/3 ≤ t < t and ΠNN(t) ∈
[1,1+t2/9] when t > t. By inspection, we can check that ΓN
a , ΓN
b and ΓN
c increase with trade
costs. Hence, when t > 4/3, the limit value of Γ above which both ﬁrms produce only in
their home country depends on trade costs contrary to the limit value of Γ below which both
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ﬁrms are multinational (see Figure 2). Finally, it is easy to check that ΓN
a = ΓN
b when t = 1
as well as 1/2 > ΓN
c > ΓN
b when t = 1 and that ΓN
c > 1/2 when t = tmax (see Figure 2).
(iii) A single multinational ﬁrm (or one-way FDI). The conﬁguration in which a ﬁrm
is a multinational whereas its rival exclusively produces in its home country is a perfect
Nash equilibrium if and only if ΓN
k > Γ > ΓM
k with k = a,b,c. In fact, case a and b are
not pertinent since the asymmetric conﬁguration is never an equilibrium as long as t < 4/3.
Trivial comparison shows that ΓN
a = ΓM
a ≡ Γa when t < 1. Then, when t ∈ (1,4/3), it
is easy to check that ΓN
b = ΓM
b when t = 1 and ΓN
b < ΓM
b when 4/3 > t > 1. Finally,
when t ≥ 4/3, we have ΓN
c > ΓM
c = 1/2. However, by inspection, ΓN
c increases with trade
costs whereas ΓM
c is unaﬀected by trade costs and there exists a range of trade costs for
which ΓN
c > ΓM
c (see Figure 2). In this case of asymmetric equilibrium, one ﬁrm produces
exclusively in its home country. Indeed, as its rival is multinational, it cannot increase its
proﬁts by producing abroad itself because of high multinationalization costs (Γ). As a result,
the competitive distortion is in favor of the multinational. The multinational ﬁrm acts as a
contestable monopoly in its home market and is multi-product while its rival is single-product
and does not export.
To sum up and as illustrated in Figure 2, we provide the following proposition.
Proposition 6 Cross-hauling FDI emerges when Γ < ΓM
a and when Γ < min{ΓM
k ,ΓN
k } with
k = b,c while intra-industry trade occurs when Γ > ΓM
a and when Γ > max{ΓM
k ,ΓN
k } with
k = b,c. When ΓN
c > Γ > ΓM
c , one-way FDI takes place while no trade emerges.
5.2 Additional comments
Some comments are in order. First, even though the countries are identical ex-ante and the
ﬁrms have the same technology, an asymmetric outcome can emerge when a ﬁrm becomes
a multi-product multinational while its rival remains single-product. To the best of our
knowledge, the theoretical literature shows that intra-industry FDI, either in homogeneous
or diﬀerentiated products, is a two-way FDI. With our framework, our analysis reveals that
one-way FDI can emerge even if the countries and technologies of ﬁrms are identical. Such a
conﬁguration arises when trade costs and multinationalization costs are high enough. Indeed,
high trade costs induce that each ﬁrm has a strong incentive to also produce abroad, leading
to higher proﬁts. However, when a ﬁrm becomes multinational, its rival prefers to produce
only in its home country because the increase in its operating proﬁts from producing abroad
are less than the cost of multinationalization. Hence, a diﬀerent strategy is preferred by each
ﬁrm. In other words, one-way FDI corresponds to a chicken game.
Second, when the multinationalization costs are low enough (Γ < 1/2), it appears that cross-
hauling FDIs emerge if and only if trade costs are high enough (see Figure 2). Such a result
is obtained by many theoretical models concerning the cause of horizontal FDI. However,
our analysis reveals that two-way FDI corresponds to a prisoner’s dilemma game. Despite
the outcome that both rivals export leads to the highest levels of proﬁts, it is rational for
each ﬁrm to set up a second plant producing the same variety abroad in order to increase its
market share in the foreign market. Consequently, the export strategy is dominated by the
multinational strategy leading to ﬁerce price competition.
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Third, as long as Γ > 1/2, the relationship between trade and trade costs is non linear (see
Figure 2). Indeed, intra-industry trade can occur when trade costs are high enough. Such a
result may explain why the empirical relationship between trade costs and FDI is not clear-
cut. For example, by performing a probit analysis, Brainard (1997) and Ekholm (1997) show
that the probability of observing aﬃliate activity is not positively and signiﬁcantly related
to trade costs.11 Neary (2005) proposes two explanations. First, foreign countries hosting
foreign plants are export platforms to serve several countries belonging to the same trading
bloc. Second, low trade costs favor cross-border mergers, which are quantitatively more
important than greenﬁeld FDI. Our explanation is based on the fact that ﬁrms are multi-
product and decide strategically the degree of product diﬀerentiation. Indeed, each rival may
prefer to export two products from its home country rather than to remain multinational for
the following reason. By exporting to serve the foreign country, the ﬁrms beneﬁt from the
asymmetric competition introduced by high trade barriers while cross-hauling FDI implies
that MNFs are single-product and price competition is ﬁerce. If we had considered that ﬁrms
were exclusively single-product, high trade barriers would have favored FDIs, as shown by
Mathieu (1997) and, in this case, E1 and E2 would have merged into one in Figure 2. Hence,
high trade barriers do not necessarily trigger foreign direct investments.
Finally, an important issue in the theory of the multinational ﬁrm is whether FDI and
trade move together as complements or are substitutes. A plausible explanation of their
complementarity is the fact that MNFs export intermediate goods to their foreign subsidiaries
for the production of a ﬁnal good, which is itself shipped back to the MNF’s home country.
In this context, a vertical FDI is more likely to be achieved with low trade costs rather than
with high trade costs, (see, among others, Helpman, 1984; Markusen, 2002; Hanson et al.,
2006). However, Baldwin and Ottaviano (2001) show that the intra-industry trade and cross-
hauling horizontal FDI can be complements by developing a model where two multi-product
ﬁrms provide four imperfectly substitutable varieties. Since, by assumption, households
consume all varieties, international trade occurs automatically when two-way FDI takes place.
In our case, when intra-industry trade takes place, no cross-hauling FDI occurs, and vice-
versa, even though ﬁrms may be multi-product. When each ﬁrm produces abroad, maximum
diﬀerentiation between varieties produced by rival ﬁrms prevails. This means that, when the
degree of product diﬀerentiation is a strategic variable, horizontally integrated multinational
corporations do not appear to simultaneously undertake both cross-hauling FDI and intra-
industry trade between parent and aﬃliates.12 This result agrees with recent empirical works
suggesting that the trade and FDI are substitutes rather than complements.13 Using product-
11However, empirical studies on the relative importance of foreign activities show that trade costs have
a positive eﬀect on the share of FDI in aﬃliates’ sales plus exports (see Navaretti and Venables, 2004 and
Blanchard et al., 2007).
12Note that we have introduced a second deviation from Baldwin and Ottaviano (2001): Bertrand com-
petition. However, as written by Baldwin and Ottaviano (2001, p. 435), Cournot or Bertrand competition
leads to the same (qualitative) result in their framework because, in both cases, the equilibrium operating
proﬁt from sales in a given market increases and is convex in equilibrium sales. As a result, the diﬀerences in
results between Baldwin and Ottaviano (2001) and our approach arise from the introduction of endogenous
product diﬀerentiation.
13At the industry level, several empirical studies show the co-existence of intra-industry trade and intra-
industry FDI (Brainard, 1997; Greenaway et al., 1998).
23Working paper SMART-LERECO N◦10-02
level data on a set of Japanese-produced ﬁnal consumer good, Blonigen (2001) shows that the
relationship between US production by Japanese ﬁrms and Japanese exports to the United
States is negative for the large majority of products. This conﬁrms the ﬁnding by Swenson
(1999) from a larger set of products identiﬁed in US data. In addition, although Head and
Ries (2001) show that more FDI generates higher exports, they also ﬁnd marked heterogeneity
across ﬁrms. Indeed, the large car makers operating in diﬀerentiated product markets exhibit
substitution between exports and FDI.
To conclude, trade and FDI are substitutes when multi-product multinationals choose stra-
tegically the technical characteristic of their products. Although the implications of our model
diﬀer from the results obtained in Baldwin and Ottaviano (2001), both models should be
viewed as complements. Indeed, the framework developped in Baldwin and Ottaviano (2001)
seems to be appropriate for market characterized by preference for diversity such as standard
goods for households. In our model, we consider the diversity in preferences so that our
analysis is more appropriate for the industry of household equipment goods. Hence, the
substitution or the complementarity between FDI and export could depend on the type of
horizontal product diﬀerentiation.
6 Concluding remarks
By considering product diﬀerentiation as a strategic variable for large ﬁrms, we shed new
light on the decision to produce abroad combined with the product range. Indeed, even when
technology has the same productivity for each variety, ﬁrms drop some of varieties with
trade integration. In addition, we have shown that each rival ﬁrm may prefer to export its
varieties when trade costs are high rather than to shift production of one variety abroad. Our
analysis also suggests that the two-way FDI can be modeled as a prisoner’s dilemma game.
Indeed, despite the conﬁguration in which ﬁrms export is an optimal outcome, each ﬁrm
produces in both countries when trade costs take intermediate values. Finally, when trade
costs are low enough, ﬁrms export and produce a single variety. Such ﬁndings reveal that the
relationship between the decision to produce abroad and trade costs is non linear and intra-
industry trade and two-way FDI are substitutes, even though ﬁrms can be multi-product.
Endogenous product diﬀerentiation is at the heart of the explanations of our results.
A future topic in the research agenda of FDI models with endogenous product diﬀerentiation
should include a welfare analysis. Indeed, the gains from trade integration are ambiguous
in our setting. On the one hand, the number of varieties available in each country declines
when trade costs fall. On the other hand, trade liberalization implies low prices. Such a
study implies taking free entry into account.
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Appendix A. Equilibrium prices (stage 3)
1. The Nash equilibrium in prices under autarky with contestability:
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Appendix B. Equilibrium FDI and exports
1. To determine whether ﬁrms decide to become multinational or not, we must distinguish
three cases: (a) low trade costs (t < 1); (b) intermediate trade costs (1 < t < 4/3); and (c)
high trade costs (4/3 < t).
(a) When t ≤ 1, the two ﬁrms are multinational if and only if (25)<(24) or, equivalently,
Γ < Γ
M
a ≡ t/3 − t
2/18 > 0.
(b) When trade costs take intermediate values (1 < t < 4/3), comparison between (27) and
(24) implies that the two ﬁrms are multinational if and only if
Γ < Γ
M




A ∈ [1/2,1) is the operating proﬁts when a ﬁrm decides to export while its rival
is a multinational (see (29)).
When t ≥ 4/3, the outcome where both ﬁrms are multinational is a perfect Nash equilibrium






b increase with trade costs when t < 4/3 and it is easy to check
that ΓM
b (4/3) = ΓM
c and ΓM
b (1) = ΓM
a (1) because xF
B(t) = 1 when t = 1 (see Figure 2).
In other words, below a limit value of trade costs (t = 4/3), the occurence that ﬁrms are
multinational is a perfect Nash equilibrium is less and less likely when trade costs decline.
In addition, when trade costs are high the probability of producing abroad does not depend
on trade costs.
2. To determine conditions under which the conﬁguration where the two ﬁrms export is a
Nash equilibrium, we also distinguish three cases: (a) low trade costs (t < 1); (b) intermediate
trade costs (1 < t < 4/3); and (c) high trade costs (4/3 < t).





(b) When trade costs take intermediate values (1 < t < 4/3), comparison between (28) and












B > 1 is the operating proﬁts when a ﬁrm becomes multinational while the other
ﬁrm exports (see (30)). By inspection, ΓN
b increases with trade costs when t < 4/3 and
ΓN
a = ΓN
b when t = 1 (see Figure 2).
(c) When t ≥ 4/3, the outcome where both ﬁrms export from their home country is a perfect
Nash equilibrium if and only if (32)<(20) or, equivalently,
Γ > Γ
N






ΠNN(t < t) = 1 + t2/9 when t < t
ΠNN(t > t) ∈ [1,1 + t2/9] when t > t.
It is worth stressing that ΓN
c increases with trade costs (t).
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